This paper examines whether nancial development facilitates economic growth by scrutinizing one rationale for such a relationship; that nancial development reduces the costs of external nance to rms. Speci cally, w e ask whether industrial sectors that are relatively more in need of external nance develop disproportionately faster in countries with more developed nancial markets. We nd this to be true in a large sample of countries over the 1980s. We show this result is unlikely to be driven by omitted variables, outliers, or reverse causality. JEL O4, F3, G1
concludes that a rough parallelism can be observed between economic and nancial development if periods of several decades are considered". Nevertheless, studies such as these simply suggest correlation. As Goldsmith puts it There is no possibility, h o wever, of establishing with con dence the direction of the causal mechanism, i.e., of deciding whether nancial factors were responsible for the acceleration of economic development or whether nancial development re ected economic growth whose mainsprings must be sought elsewhere." While Goldsmith is agnostic, other economists have expressed downright scepticism that nancial development i s anything but a sideshow to economic development. Joan Robinson 1952, p86 is representative of such a viewpoint when she claims where enterprise leads, nance follows".
In an important recent paper, Robert G. King and Ross Levine 1993a investigate the causality problem following a post hoc, ergo propter hoc approach. They show that the predetermined component of nancial development is a good predictor of growth over the next 10 to 30 years. However, the sceptic could still o er a number of arguments against attributing causality.
First, both nancial development and growth could be driven by a common omitted variable such as the propensity of households in the economy t o s a ve. Since endogenous savings in certain models of growth a ects the long run growth rate of the economy, i t m a y not be surprising that growth and initial nancial development are correlated. This argument is also hard to refute with simple cross-country regressions. In the absence of a well accepted theory of growth, the list of potential omitted variables that nancial sector development might b e a proxy for is large, and the explanatory variables to include a matter of conjecture.
Second, nancial development t ypically measured by the level of credit and the size of the stock marke t m a y predict economic growth simply because nancial markets anticipate future growth; the stock market capitalizes the present v alue of growth opportunities, while nancial institutions lend more if they think sectors will grow. Thus nancial development m a y simply be a leading indicator rather than a causal factor.
One way to make progress on causality is to focus on the details of theoretical mechanisms through which nancial development a ects economic growth, and document their working. Our paper is an attempt to do this. Speci cally, theorists argue that nancial markets and institutions help a rm overcome problems of moral hazard and adverse selection, thus reducing the rm's cost of raising money from outsiders. So nancial development should disproportionately help rms or industries typically dependent on external nance for their growth. Such a nding could be the`smoking gun' in the debate about causality. There are two virtues to this simple test. First, it looks for evidence of a speci c mechanism by which nance a ects growth, thus providing a stronger test of causality. Second, it can correct for xed country and industry e ects. Though its contribution depends on how reasonable our micro-economic assumptions are, it is less dependent on a speci c macroeconomic model of growth.
We construct the test as follows. We identify an industry's need for external nance the di erence between investments and cash generated from operations from data on U.S. rms. Under the assumption that capital markets in the United States, especially for the large listed rms we analyze, are relatively frictionless, this method allows us to identify an industry's technological demand for external nancing. Under the further assumption that such a technological demand carries over to other countries, we examine whether industries that are more dependent on external nancing grow relatively faster in countries that, a priori, are more nancially developed.
This would imply that, ceteris paribus, an industry such as Drugs and Pharmaceuticals, which requires a lot of external funding, should develop relatively faster than Tobacco, which requires little external nance, in countries that are more nancially developed. Consider, for instance, Malaysia, Korea, and Chile, which are moderate-income, fast-growing, countries, that di er considerably in their nancial development. Consistent with our hypothesis, in Malaysia, which w as the most nancially developed by our measures, Drugs and Pharmaceuticals grew at a 4 percent higher annual real rate over the 1980s than Tobacco the growth rate for each industry is adjusted for the worldwide growth rate of that industry. In Korea, which w as moderately nancially developed, Drugs grew at a 3 p ercent higher rate than Tobacco. In Chile, which was in the lowest quartile of nancial development, Drugs grew at a 2.5 percent lower rate than Tobacco. So nancial development seems to a ect relative growth rates of industries in the way predicted. We establish this result more systematically for a large cross-section of industries and countries in the body of the paper.
Delving deeper into the components of growth, industry growth can be decomposed into the growth in the number of establishments and the growth in the average size of existing estab-lishments. New establishments are more likely to be new rms, which depend more on external nance than established rms. So the growth of the number of establishments in industries dependent on external nance should be particularly sensitive to nancial development. This is indeed the case. Our estimates suggest that nancial development has almost twice the economic e ect on the growth of the number of establishments as it has on the growth of the average size of establishments. This suggests that an additional indirect channel through which nancial development could in uence growth is by disproportionately improving the prospects of young rms. If these are typically innovators, they make possible Schumpeterian waves of creative destruction" that would not even get initiated in countries with less developed markets.
Let us be careful about what we nd, and about what we h a ve little to say. Our ndings suggest that the ex ante development of nancial markets facilitates the ex post growth of sectors dependent on external nance. This implies that the link between nancial development and growth identi ed elsewhere may stem, at least in part, from a channel identi ed by the theory:
nancial markets and institutions reduce the cost of external nance for rms. Of course, our analysis suggests only that nancial development liberates rms from the drudgery of generating funds internally. It is ultimately the availability of pro table investment opportunities that drives growth, and we h a ve little to say about where these come from. In the imagery of Rondo Cameron 1967, p2, we nd evidence consistent with nance as a lubricant, essential no doubt, but not a substitute for the machine.
Our paper relates closely to three recent papers that attempt to establish the direction of causation of the nance-growth correlation. Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Vojislav Maksimovic 1996 also use micro data to develop a test of the in uence of nancial development on growth. Using rm-level data, they estimate the proportion of rms whose rate of growth exceeds the growth that could have been supported only by i n ternal resources. They then run a cross country regression and nd that this proportion is positively related to the stock market turnover and to a measure of law enforcement. There are two essential di erences from our paper. First, their estimate of the internal growth rate of a rm is dependent on the rm's characteristics. While it is potentially more accurate than our measure of external dependence, it is also more endogenous. Second, they focus on between-country di erences in the spirit of traditional crosscountry regressions, while our focus is on within-country, b e t ween-industry di erences. The latter is an important innovation in this paper.
Jith Jayaratne and Philip E. Strahan 1996 examine the liberalization of the banking sector in di erent states in the United States in recent y ears and show that this had a positive in uence on a state's growth. Our attempt to correct for xed e ects is similar to theirs. They use di erences in growth rates across the temporal shock of liberalization while we use di erences between industries within a country to do so. Since they focus on a very nice natural experiment to provide identi cation, their methodology may be harder to apply to di erent countries or di erent questions. But the more important di erence is that we focus on providing evidence for a micro-economic channel through which nance is supposed to work rather than examining, as they do, the broader correlation between nance and growth.
Finally, Levine and Sarah Zervos 1996 study whether stock markets and banks promote economic growth. They nd that measures of market liquidity are strongly related to growth, capital accumulation, and productivity, while surprisingly, more traditional measures of development such as stock market size are not as robustly correlated. They also nd that bank lending to the private sector has a strong independent e ect on growth. They focus on a richer set of measures of nancial development and growth than we do, but their cross-country regression methodology is also more traditional. The two studies should be viewed as complementary, theirs providing information on a broader set of correlations, while ours details a mechanism.
The rest of the paper is as follows. We start by describing the theoretical underpinnings of our work in section 1 and then our measure of external dependence in section 2. In section 3, we present our data on nancial development, country characteristics, and industry growth. In section 4 we set up our main test and discuss the results. We explore other tests and the robustness of our ndings in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
I Theoretical Underpinnings and The Basic Test.
A Theoretical Underpinnings
There has been extensive theoretical work on the relationship between nancial development and economic growth. Economists have emphasized the role of nancial development in better identifying investment opportunities, reducing investment in liquid but unproductive assets, mobilizing savings, boosting technological innovation, and improving risk taking. 1 All these activities can lead to greater economic growth. We do not have the space to go into all these theories see Levine 1997 for a comprehensive recent survey so we content ourselves with outlining the essential theoretical underpinnings for our test.
Jeremy Greenwood and Boyan Jovanovic 1990 develop a model where the extent of nancial intermediation and economic growth are endogenously determined. In their model, nancial intermediaries can invest more productively than individuals because of their better ability to identify investment opportunities. So nancial intermediation promotes growth because it allows a higher rate of return to be earned on capital, and growth in turn provides the means to implement costly nancial structures. Equivalently, the model could be recast to show that nancial development reduces the cost of raising funds from sources external to the rm relative to the cost of internally generated cash ows. External funds are generally thought to be costlier because outsiders have less control over the borrower's actions see, for example, Michael C. Jensen and William R. Meckling 1976 or because they know less about what the borrower will do with the funds see Joseph E. Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss 1981 and Stewart C. Myers and Nicholas S. Majluf 1984. Financial development, in the form of better accounting and disclosure rules, and better corporate governance through institutions, will reduce the wedge between the cost of internal and external funds and enhance growth, especially for rms that are most reliant on external nancing. 2 A second issue is how nancial development takes place. Some economists take the development of the nancial market as exogenous to the model arguing that di erences in the extent of nancial markets across countries seem to depend primarily on legislation and government regulation" Bencivenga and Smith p 207. By contrast, Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990 have a once-and-for-all" lump sum cost of development and development is endogenous to their framework. From the perspective of our paper, it really does not matter whether legal and political or economic forces are responsible for nancial development. Our focus is on whether the pre-determined level of nancial development a ects growth. All we need for the stock o f nancial development to matter even when development is endogenous is that there be a cost to development as in Greenwood and Jovanovic or that nancial development cannot happen instantaneously as in reputational models of nancial development such as Douglas W. Diamond 1989. Either assumption seems plausible.
If nancial development cannot take place at low cost and on the y, the above theories would suggest that the a priori existence of a well-developed nancial market should disproportionately improve the ex post growth rates of industries that are technologically more dependent o n external funds.
B The basic test
The most disaggregated comprehensive data on growth that we h a ve for countries is at the industry level data at the rm level, if available, is typically limited to large listed rms. Our hypothesis is that industries that are more dependent on external nancing will have relatively higher growth rates in countries that have more developed nancial markets.
Therefore, the dependent v ariable is the average annual real growth rate of value added in industry j in country k over the period 1980-1990. If we can measure industry j's dependence on external nance and country k's nancial development, then after correcting for country and industry e ects we m ust nd that the coe cient estimate for the interaction between dependence and development is positive.
The most e ective w ay of correcting for country and industry characteristics is to use indicator variables, one for each country and industry. Only additional explanatory variables that vary both with industry and country need be included. These are industry j's share in country k of total value added in manufacturing in 1980 and the primary variable of interest, the interaction between industry j's dependence on external nancing and nancial market development in country k.
The model we w ant to estimate is then Data on the actual use of external nancing is typically not available. But even if it were, it would not be useable because it would re ect the equilibrium between the demand for external funds and its supply. Since the latter is precisely what we are attempting to test for, this information is contaminated. Moreover, we are not aware of systematic studies of the external nancing needs of di erent industries, either cross-sectionally or over time. 4 We, therefore, have to nd some other way of identifying an industry's dependence on external nancing. We assume that there is a technological reason why some industries depend more on external nance than others. To the extent that the initial project scale, the gestation period, the cash harvest period, and the requirement for continuing investment di er substantially between industries, this is indeed plausible. Furthermore, we assume that these technological di erences persist across countries, so that we can use an industry's dependence on external funds as identi ed in the U.S. as a measure of its dependence in other countries. While there are enormous di erences in local conditions between countries, all we really need is that statements of the following sort hold: If pharmaceuticals require a larger initial scale and have a higher gestation period before cash ows are harvested than the textile industry in the U.S., it also requires a larger initial scale and has a higher gestation period in Korea.
B How the proxy is calculated.
We start by computing the external nancing needs of U.S. companies over the 1980s. We use data from Compustat for this. Compustat does not contain a representative sample of U.S.
rms, because it is limited to publicly traded rms, which are relatively large. Nevertheless, we regard this as an advantage for two reasons. First, in a perfect capital market the supply of funds to rms is perfectly elastic at the proper risk adjusted rate. In such a market the actual amount of external funds raised by a rm equals its desired amount. In other words, in such a n idealized setting, the identi cation problem does not exist. But capital markets in the United States are among the most advanced in the world, and large publicly traded rms typically face the least frictions in accessing nance. Thus the amount of external nance used by large rms in the United States is likely to be a relatively pure measure of their demand for external nance. 5 A second reason for using a database on listed rms is that disclosure requirements imply that the data on nancing are comprehensive. For most of the paper, we will take the amount of external nance used by U.S. rms in an industry as a proxy for the desired amount foreign rms in the same industry would have liked to raise had their nancial markets been more developed.
Next, we h a ve to de ne precisely what we mean by external and internal nance. We are interested in the amount of desired investment that cannot be nanced through internal cash ows generated by the same business. Therefore, a rm's dependence on external nance is de ned as the ratio of capital expenditures Compustat 128 minus cash ow from operations divided by capital expenditures. Cash ow from operations is broadly de ned as the sum of Compustat cash ow from operations Compustat 110 plus decreases in inventories, decreases in receivables, and increases in payables. 6 Note that this de nition includes changes in the nonnancial components of net working capital as part of funds from operations. In fact, in certain businesses these represent major sources or uses of funds, that help a rm avoid or force it to tap external sources of funds. 7 Similarly, the dependence on external equity nance is de ned as the ratio of the net amount of equity issues Compustat 108 minus 115 to capital expenditures. Finally, the investment intensity is the ratio of capital expenditure to net property plant and equipment Compustat 8.
To make these measures comparable with the industry level data we h a ve for other countries, we h a ve t o c hoose how to aggregate these ratios over time and across companies. We sum the rm's use of external nance over the 1980s and then divide by the sum of capital expenditure over the 1980s to get the rm's dependence on external nance in the 1980s. This smooths temporal uctuations and reduces the e ects of outliers. To summarize ratios across rms, however, we use the industry median. We do this to prevent large rms from swamping the information from small rms; for instance, we know that IBM's free cash ow does not alleviate possible cash ow shortages of small computer rms.
C External dependence for di erent industries.
In Table 1 , we tabulate by I n ternational Standard Classi cation Code ISIC the fraction of investments U.S. rms nanced externally rst column and the level of capital expenditures divided by net property plant and equipment second column. We restrict our attention to those manufacturing industries for which w e h a ve v alue-added data from the United Nations Statistics. Drugs and Pharmaceuticals emerge as the industry that uses the most external nance, with Plastics and Computing coming close behind. Tobacco, on the other hand, generates the most excess cash ow and has negative external funding needs. It is common wisdom in the corporate nance literature though we w ere hard-pressed to nd formal empirical studies of this phenomenon that there is a life cycle in the pattern of nancing for rms; rms are more dependent on external nancing early in their life than later. Figure 1 supports the common wisdom. It plots the median nancing and investment needs across U.S.
rms as a function of the numb e r o f y ears since the initial public o ering IPO. Not surprisingly, in the year of the IPO, rms raise a substantial amount of external funds especially equity. More interestingly, this continues albeit on a smaller scale up to approximately the 10th year. After that period, net equity issues go to zero and the usage of external nance uctuates around zero. In the third and fourth columns of Table 1 , we report the external dependence and capital expenditures for mature companies rms that were listed for more than 10 years, while the fth and sixth columns are for young companies rms that were listed for less than 10 years. 8 This pattern appears to be fairly standard across di erent industries, though there are exceptions. All this suggests that very young rms are more dependent on external nance than older rms. This fact will provide an additional test of our hypothesis.
D Is the Dependence of U.S. Firms a Good Proxy?
Much of our analysis rests on dependence of U.S. rms on external nance being a good proxy for the demand for external funds in other countries. We think this is reasonable for four reasons.
First, in a steady state equilibrium there will not be much need for external funds, as Figure 1 shows. Therefore, much of the demand for external funds is likely to arise as a result of technological shocks that raise an industry's investment opportunities beyond what internal funds can support. To the extent these shocks are worldwide, the need for funds of U.S. rms represents a good proxy. 9 Second, even if the new investment opportunities generated by these worldwide shocks di er across countries, the amount of cash ow produced by existing rms in a certain industry is likely to be similar across countries. In fact, most of the determinants of ratio of cash ow to capital are likely to be similar worldwide: the level of demand for a certain product, its stage in the life cycle, and its cash harvest period. For this reason, we make sure that our results hold even when we use the amount o f i n ternally generated cash, rather than the di erence between investments and internally generated funds. We also check that the results hold when we use dependence as measured in Canada, a country which has well developed capital markets but a very di erent banking system and industry concentration than the United States. Unfortunately, w e do not have access to ow of funds data from any other countries, so we cannot venture further a eld, but this methodology could, in principle, be used with dependence measured in any country with well functioning capital markets.
Third, one might argue that the stage of the product life cycle that U.S. rms are in is likely to be di erent from that of foreign rms. Given that our sample is biased toward developing countries one might think that the U.S. industry in the 1970s might be a better proxy for the position of developing countries in a product life cycle. For this reason, we also explore the robustness of our results to measuring the dependence of U.S. rms in the 1970s rather than in the 1980s. We also distinguish between dependence as measured for young rms in the United States less than 10 years from listing and dependence for old rms more than 10 years from listing.
Last but not least, that we only have a noisy measure of the need for funds creates a bias against nding any i n teraction between dependence and nancial development.
III Data.
A Data on industries.
Data on value added and gross xed capital formation for each industry in each country are obtained from the Yearbook of Industrial Statistics vol 1 database put together by the United Nations Statistics Division. We c hecked the data for inconsistencies, changes in classi cation of sectors, and changes in units. The U.N. data is classi ed by I n ternational SIC code. In order to obtain the amount of external nance used by the industry in the U.S., we matched ISIC codes with SIC codes. 10 Typically, the three digit ISIC codes correspond to two digit SIC codes, while the four digit ISIC code corresponds to three digit SIC codes. In order to reduce the dependence on country speci c factors like natural resources we con ne our analysis to manufacturing rms U.S. SIC 2000-3999.
We w ould like data on as many countries as possible. The binding constraint is the availability of measures of nancial development speci cally the availability of data on accounting standards. Since we also wanted data on equity market capitalization, we started with the 55 countries from the Emerging Stock Markets Factbook. We dropped countries like K u wait that did not report a stock market capitalization till the latter half of the 1980s. We could not use Hong Kong and Taiwan because data on these countries are not present i n t h e International Financial Statistics volumes. We also dropped countries for which w e did not have data from the Yearbook database that is separated by at least ve y ears notably, Switzerland. Finally, Thailand is dropped because the U.N. notes that data from year to year are not comparable. The United States is excluded from the analysis because it is our benchmark. This leaves us with the 43 countries in Table 2 .
We w ant to see if nancially dependent industries are likely to be better o in countries with well developed nancial sectors. The availability of nance a ects not just investment but also the ability to nance operations and sales through working capital. Therefore, the most appropriate measure of an industry being better o " is the growth in value added for that industry, i.e., the change in the log of real value added in that industry between 1980 and 1990. Real value added in 1990 is obtained by de ating value added by the Producer Price Index. For high in ation countries, spurious di erences in value added may be obtained simply because the UN data are measured at a di erent point from the PPI index. So, instead, we determine the e ective de ator by dividing the growth in nominal value added for the entire manufacturing sector in the UN database by the index of industrial production which measures the real growth rate in industrial production obtained from the IFS statistics.
B Data on countries.
The Gross Domestic Product, the Producer Price Index, the exchange rate, and the Index of Industrial Production are all obtained from International Financial Statistics I.F.S. published by the International Monetary Fund. Whenever a particular series is not available, we use close substitutes for instance, the wholesale price index if the producer price index is not available. Data on a country's human capital average years of schooling in population over 25 is obtained from the Barro-Lee les downloaded from the NBER web site see Barro and Jong Wha Lee 1993. C Measures of nancial development.
Ideally, nancial development should measure the ease with which borrowers and savers can be brought together, and once together, the con dence they have in one another. Thus nancial development should be related to the variety o f i n termediaries and markets available, the eciency with which they perform the evaluation, monitoring, certi cation, communication and distribution functions, and the legal and regulatory framework assuring performance. Since there is little agreement o n h o w these are appropriately measured, and even less data available, we will have t o m a k e do with crude proxies even though they may miss many of the aspects we think vital to a modern nancial system.
The rst measure of nancial development w e use is fairly traditional the ratio of domestic credit plus stock market capitalization to GDP. W e call this the capitalization ratio. We obtain stock market capitalization for all countries listed in the Emerging Stock Markets Factbook published by the International Finance Corporation, which contains data on developed countries also. 11 Domestic credit is obtained from the International Financial Statistics. Speci cally, i t is the sum of IFS lines 32a through 32f and excluding 32e. Finally, domestic credit allocated to the private sector is IFS line 32d.
Despite the virtue of tradition, there are concerns with this measure. Unlike domestic credit, stock market capitalization does not re ect the amount of funding actually obtained by issuers. Instead, it re ects a composite of retained earnings, the investing public's perception of the corporate sector's growth prospects, and actual equity issuances. One could argue that the amount of money raised through initial public o erings and secondary o erings is more suitable for our purpose. Unfortunately, these data are not widely available. At the same time, one cannot dismiss the capitalization measure in favor of actual nancing too easily. The net amount raised from U.S. equity markets by large rms was negative in the 1980s see, for example, Rajan and Zingales 1995. So the actual amount raised may underestimate the importance of the stock market's role in providing price information and liquidity t o i n vestors. Market capitalization may be a better measure of the importance of the stock market in this respect. Since we are unsure about whether market capitalization is a reasonable proxy, w e will check that the results are robust to rede ning the capitalization ratio as the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector to GDP.
The second proxy for nancial development w e use is the accounting standards in a country. Unlike our rst measure, accounting standards re ect the potential for obtaining nance rather than the actual nance raised. Speci cally, the higher the standards of nancial disclosure in a country, the easier it will be for rms to raise funds from a wider circle of investors. The Center for International Financial Analysis and Research CIFAR creates an index for di erent countries by rating the annual reports of at least three rms in every country on the inclusion or omission of 90 items. Thus each country obtains a score out of 90 with a higher number indicating more disclosure. The Center for International Financial Analysis and Research which produces this data started analyzing balance sheets from 1983 onwards. However, their rst comprehensive survey dates from 1990. We will use the accounting standards as measured in this study in much of the paper. The date of the survey raises concerns about endogeneity, but we believe such concerns are small to begin with, and can easily be addressed. First, accounting standards do not change much o ver time. In 1995, the CIFAR published a study examining how accounting standards had changed since 1983. This study estimated the standards in 1983 and 1990 based on a subset of annual reports, and for a subset of countries that are in the comprehensive 1990 survey. The study nds the mean accounting standards for countries followed both in 1983 and 1990 is the same at 65. The Wilcoxon signed rank test for equality of distributions fails to reject the equality of the distribution of accounting standards across countries in the two y ears. Finally, the correlation between the accounting standards in 1983 and 1990 is 0.75. 12 Nevertheless, we will instrument accounting standards with variables that predate the period of growth that we are looking at. Also, we will use the 1983 data to see that the results hold in the subset of countries for which i t i s a vailable.
Both our measures of nancial development, accounting standards and the capitalization ratio, are tabulated for the di erent countries see Table 2 . While more developed countries have better accounting standards, there are exceptions. For instance, Malaysia scores as high as Australia or Canada, while Belgium and Germany are in the same league as Korea, Philippines, or Mexico. Portugal has among the worst accounting standards.
Before we go the the summary statistics, note that for a country's nancial development to have a n y e ect on industrial growth in that country we h a ve to assume that rms nance themselves largely in their own country. In other words, only if world capital markets are not perfectly integrated can domestic nancial development a ect a country's growth. There is a wealth of evidence documenting the existence of frictions in international capital markets: the extremely high correlation between a country's savings and its investments Martin Feldstein and Charles Horioka, 1980 , the strong home bias in portfolio investments Kenneth R. French and James M. Poterba, 1991, and cross countries di erences in expected returns Geert Bekaert and Cambell R. Harvey, 1995. We h a ve little else to say about this assumption other than noting that its failure would weaken the power of our test but not necessarily bias our ndings.
Summary statistics and correlations are in Table 3 . A number of correlations are noteworthy. First, the nancial sector is more developed in richer countries. The correlation of per capita income in 1980 with accounting standards and capitalization is 0.56 and 0.26 signi cant at the 1 percent and 10 percent level respectively. Second, the correlation between our capitalization measure of nancial development and accounting standards is 0.41 signi cant at the 5 percent level for the 33 countries for which w e have both data. However, the correlations between accounting standards and the components of capitalization di er. Accounting standards are strongly correlated with equity market capitalization correlation = 0.45, signi cant at the 1 percent level but not with domestic credit correlation = 0.25, not signi cant. Domestic credit is credit o ered by depository institutions and the central bank. One explanation of the low correlation is perhaps that institutions rely on their own private investigations, and credit from them is little a ected by accounting standards. Another possible explanation is that when accounting standards are low, only institutions o er credit. But even though institutions bene t from improvements in accounting standards, other sources of nance become available, and rms substitute away from their traditional sources. We cannot distinguish between these explanations. It will su ce for our purpose that the overall availability of nance, whatever its source, increases with nancial development.
IV Financial dependence and growth
A Results from the basic regression.
A.1 Varying measures of nancial development Table 4 reports the estimates of our basic speci cation 1 obtained by using various measures of nancial development. Since the speci cation controls for country-speci c e ects and industryspeci c e ects, the only e ects that are identi ed are those relative t o v ariables that vary both cross countries and cross industries. Thus, Table 4 reports only the coe cient of the industry's share of total value added at the beginning of the sample and the coe cient of the interaction between external dependence and di erent measures of nancial development. 13 Since we use U.S. data to identify the external dependence, we drop the United States in all regressions.
We start with total capitalization as the proxy for development. As can be seen in the rst column of Table 4 , the coe cient estimate for the interaction term is positive and statistically signi cant at the 1 percent level throughout the paper, the reported standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. 14 The interaction term is akin to a second derivative. One way to get a sense of its magnitude is as follows; the industry at the 75th percentile of dependence high dependence is Machinery. The industry at the 25th percentile low dependence is Beverages. The country at the 75th percentile of development as measured by capitalization is Italy, while the country at the 25th percentile is Philippines. We set the industry's initial share of manufacturing at its overall mean. The coe cient estimate then predicts that Machinery should grow 1.3 percent faster than Beverages annually, and in real terms, in Italy as compared to Philippines. For comparison, the real annual growth rate is, on average, 3.4 percent per year. So a di erential of 1.3 percent i s a large number.
For each speci cation, we compute a similar number which is reported as the di erential in real growth rate in the last row of each table. Of course, the countries at the 75th and 25th percentile vary with the measure of development as do the industries at the 75th and 25th percentile with the measure of dependence.
The rest of the columns of the table include di erent measures of development. We include domestic credit to the private sector in the second column, accounting standards in the third column, and accounting standards from the 1983 subsample in the fourth column for ease of presentation, accounting standards have been divided by 100 in the estimation. The coe cients are uniformly signi cant at the 1 percent level. The economic magnitudes as measured by the di erential in growth rates are also similar except when development is measured by accounting standards in 1983. The magnitude in column IV falls to approximately half of its level otherwise. The explanation for this fall is, perhaps, that the 1983 subsample, being based on just a few companies for each country, i n troduces signi cant measurement error. 15 In the fth column, we include both total capitalization and accounting standards. The coe cient for total capitalization is no longer di erent from zero and its magnitude falls to one fth of its level in the rst column. Similar results are obtained when we replace total capitalization by domestic credit to the private sector coe cients not reported. This suggests that accounting standards capture the information about development that is contained in the capitalization measures. For this reason, we will use accounting standards as our measure of development in the rest of the paper. The reader should be assured, however, that the results are qualitatively similar when capitalization measures of development are used.
Because of potential concerns about endogeneity, w e will, however, instrument accounting standards with predetermined institutional variables. Rafael La Porta et al. 1996 suggest that the origin of a country's legal system has an e ect on the development of a domestic capital market and on the nature of the accounting system. Countries colonized by the British, in particular, tend to have sophisticated accounting standards while countries in uenced by the French tend to have poor standards. This suggests using the colonial origin of a country's legal system indicators for whether it is British, French, German, or Scandinavian as reported in La Porta, et al. as one instrument. Also, countries di er in the extent to which l a ws are enforced. So we use an index for the e ciency and integrity of the legal system produced by Business International Corporation a country-risk rating agency as another instrument. As the sixth column of Table 4 shows, the fundamental interaction becomes even stronger in magnitude when we estimate it using instrumental variables.
Before going further, consider the actual rather than estimated e ects of development o n the growth of speci c industries. In Table 5 , we summarize for the three least dependent and three most dependent industries, the residual growth rate obtained after partialling out industry and country e ects. The pattern is remarkable. For countries below the median in accounting standards, the residual growth rate of the three least dependent industries is positive, while the residual growth rate of the three most dependent industries is negative. The pattern reverses for countries above the median. Clearly, this suggests no single country or industry drives our results and the realized di erential in growth rates is systematic and large.
A.2 Varying measures of dependence.
We n o w c heck that our measure of dependence is, indeed, reasonable. We do this in two w ays. First, we c heck that past nancing in a country is related to the external dependence of industries in the country. Second, we c heck that our result is robust to di erent measures of dependence.
Total capitalization is a crude measure of how m uch nance has been raised in the past in the country. If external dependence is a proxy for an industry's technological need for external nance outside the United States, then countries more specialized in externally dependent industries should have higher capitalization. We calculate the weighted average dependence for each country by m ultiplying an industry's dependence on external nance by the fraction that the industry contributes to value added in the manufacturing sector in 1980. We then regress total capitalization against weighted average dependence for the 43 countries in the sample. Weighted average dependence is strongly positively correlated with capitalization in 1980 = 2 :89, t=3.06. This suggests that our measure of dependence in the United States is related to the external nancing used by industry in other countries. 16 Next, in Table 6 we c heck that the results are robust to using the external dependence measured for the sample of young rms. Since Figure 1 suggests that most of the demand for external funds is expressed early on in the life of a company, i t m a y be legitimate to expect this to be a better measure of an industry's nancial needs. Regardless of how w e measure nancial development, the interaction e ect is positive and statistically signi cant at the 10 percent level or better and at the 5 percent level when we use instrumented accounting standards. The magnitude of the coe cient, however, is smaller roughly a third of the one estimated in Table 6 . In part, this re ects the higher level of the external nance raised by y oung companies. But even when we take this into account see last row of the table, a di erence, albeit smaller, persist. One possible explanation for this result is that young rms are not as important as mature rms in in uencing the growth of the industry. W e shall return on this issue in section V.A. In Table 7 , we undertake further robustness checks on our measure of external dependence. While we v ary the measure of external dependence, we maintain as a measure of nancial development a country's accounting standards, instrumented as above.
In the rst column, external dependence is calculated restricting the sample only to mature rms listed for more than 10 years in the United States. Our interaction variable is positive and statistically signi cant and the estimated di erential growth rate 0.9 percent is similar to that for the entire sample.
Next, we c heck whether there is persistence in dependence. If the pattern of nancing in the United States in the 1980s is very di erent from the pattern in the 1970s, it would be unreasonable to expect it to carry any information for other countries especially developing countries that may use older technologies. The raw correlation between an industry's demand for external nancing in the 1980s and its demand in the 1970s is 0.63. The coe cient estimate when dependence is measured by the demand for external nancing in the 1970s is statistically signi cant, and the estimated di erential growth rate is 0.9 percent.
Finally, i t m a y be that our results derive from the peculiarities of the U.S. over the 1980s. Our method should work so long as we measure dependence in a country where nancial constraints are thought to be small so that we measure demand not supply. The only other country we have detailed data on ow of funds for is Canada. Canada is very di erent from the U.S. along important dimensions. Its banking system is more concentrated as is corporate ownership, and the composition of its industries is di erent. Nevertheless, the correlation between dependence measured in the United States and dependence measured in Canada is 0.77. As the third column of Table 7 shows, the coe cient estimate when dependence is measured using Canadian data is highly signi cant. What is especially interesting both in this table and Table 4 is that the economic magnitude of the interaction e ect is generally similar despite variation in the measure of dependence and development used.
V Other Tests
A Decomposition of sources of growth.
An industry can grow because new establishments are added to the industry or because existing establishments grow in size. The U.N. database also reports the number of establishments in an industry. 17 In our sample, it turns out that two-thirds of the growth is spurred by an increase in the average size of establishments, while the remaining third is accounted for by an increase in the number of establishments. The growth in the number of establishments is the log of the number of ending-period establishments less the log of the number of establishments in the beginning of period. The average size of establishments in the industry is obtained by dividing the value added in the industry by the number of establishments, and the growth in average size is obtained again as a di erence in logs.
Although the de nition of establishments provided by the Yearbook of Industrial Statistics does not coincide with the legal de nition of a rm, there are three reasons why i t i s i n teresting to decompose the e ect of nancial development in its e ect on the growth in the number of establishments and growth in the size of the existing establishments. First, since this statistic is often compiled by a di erent body in a country from the one that produces the value-added data, this test provides an independent c heck on our results. 18 Second, the creation of new establishments is more likely to require external funds, while the expansion of existing establishments can also use internal funds. Thus, the e ect of nancial development should be more pronounced for the rst than for the second. Finally, the growth in the number of establishments is more likely to be generated by new rms than the growth in the size of the existing establishments. Thus, the growth in the number of establishments should be more sensitive t o the external dependence measured using young rms in the United States.
We, then, estimate the basic regression with growth in number of establishments and growth in average size as dependent v ariables. As Table 8 indicates, the interaction variable is statistically signi cant only when explaining the growth in the number of establishments. More important, the di erential in growth rate suggested by the estimate is twice as large in the second column the regression with growth in numbers as the dependent v ariable as in the rst column the regression with growth in average size as the dependent v ariable.
This nding that the development of nancial markets has a disproportional impact on the growth of new establishments is suggestive. Financial development could indirectly in uence growth by allowing new ideas to develop and challenge existing ones, much a s S c humpeter argued.
Recall that in the previous section, we found that the dependence of young rms was of lower importance both statistical and economic than the dependence of mature rms in explaining the relative growth of industries. One explanation is that the dependence of young rms in the United States is an accurate measure of the needs of new rms in that industry elsewhere but only a noisy measure of the dependence of all rms. This seems to be the case. When dependence is measured for young rms, the interaction coe cient has a positive, statistically signi cant, e ect on the growth in the number of establishments, but a negative and statistically insigni cant e ect on the growth of the average size of existing establishments third and fourth columns; when dependence is measured for mature rms, the interaction coe cient has a positive a statistically signi cant e ect on both.
Since most of growth in value added is generated by an increase in the average size of existing establishments, the most appropriate measure of external dependence seems to be one that includes both the needs of new rms as well as the needs of existing rms. This is why i n the rest of the paper we shall use external dependence measured across all rms.
B Is the Interaction a Proxy for Other Variables?
Do external dependence or nancial development proxy for something else? In principle, there is a long list of sources of comparative advantage that may dictate the presence, absence, or growth of industries in a country. Our results, though, cannot be explained unless the dependence of industries on this source of comparative advantage is strongly correlated with their dependence on external funding and nancial development i s a g o o d p r o xy for the source of comparative advantage. We rule out two such possibilities below.
Industries that are highly dependent on external nance for example, drugs and pharmaceuticals could also be dependent o n h uman capital inputs. To the extent that nancial market development and the availability o f h uman capital are correlated, the observed interaction between external dependence and nancial development m a y proxy for the interaction between human capital dependence and the availability of trained human capital. To c heck this, we include in the basic regression an interaction between the industry's dependence on external nance and a measure of the country's stock o f h uman capital average years of schooling in population over age 25. If the conjecture is true, the coe cient of the nancial development interaction term should fall substantially. As the coe cient estimates in the rst column of Table 9 show, the coe cient on the human capital interaction term is small and not statistically signi cant, while the nancial development i n teraction increases somewhat. This suggests that nancial dependence is not a proxy for the industry's dependence on human capital. Another possibility is that lower dependence on external nancing in the United States simply re ects the greater maturity of the industry. An in uential view of the development process is that as technologies mature, industries using those technologies migrate from developed economies to developing economies see, for example, Rudiger Dornbusch, Stanley Fischer, and Paul A. Samuelson 1977. Since developing countries are more likely to have underdeveloped nancial markets, the interaction e ect we document m a y simply re ect the stronger growth of mature technologies in underdeveloped countries.
We already have results suggesting this cannot be the entire explanation. The interaction e ect is present e v en when dependence is measured only for young rms in the United States. Furthermore, we can test if nancial development is really a proxy for economic development in the regression. We include in the basic regression the interaction between the industry's dependence on external nance and the log per capita GDP for the country, in addition to our usual interaction term. As seen in the second column of Table 9 , the coe cient of the interaction term falls from 0.165 in the basic regression to 0.149 but is still statistically and economically signi cant. The interaction between nancial dependence and log per capita income is close to zero and not signi cant. The results do not suggest nancial dependence is a proxy for technological maturity. C Other explanations: Reverse Causality.
Thus far, we h a ve taken the state of nancial markets as predetermined and exogenous. An alternative explanation of the development of nancial markets is that they arise to accommodate the nancing needs of nance-hungry industries.
The argument is as follows. Suppose there are some underlying country speci c factors or endowments such as natural resources that favor certain industries such as mining that happen to be nance hungry. Then, countries abundant in these factors should experience higher growth rates in nancially dependent industries and as a result should develop a strong nancial market. If these factors persist, then growth rates in nancially dependent sectors will persist and we will observe the signi cant i n teraction e ect. But here it will result from omitted factors than any bene cial e ect of nance.
On the one hand, the lack of persistence in country growth over periods of decades see William Easterly, et al. 1993 and the low correlation of sectoral growth across decades Peter Klenow, 1995 suggest that this should not be a major concern. On the other hand, our nding that capitalization is higher when the weighted average dependence of industries in the country is high indicates the argument is not implausible.
The results we already have should reduce concerns about reverse causality. By restricting the sample to manufacturing rms, we h a ve reduced the in uence of availability of natural resources. More important, the measure of nancial development w e use, accounting standards, is instrumented with pre-determined variables that are unlikely to be correlated with omitted factors driving the growth of industries dependent on external nance. In fact, it should be less correlated with past nancing than the capitalization measure, yet it explains future relative growth rates better.
However, we can also test the argument more directly. If an industry has a substantial presence in a particular country, it is logical that the country has the necessary resources and talents for the industry. S o b y further restricting the sample to industries that are above the median size in the country in 1980, we reduce the problem of di erences in growth stemming from di erences in endowment. When we estimate the regression with this smaller sample third column of Table 9 , the interaction coe cient is virtually unchanged.
One way t o m a k e sense of all our ndings without reverse causality driving the results is that nancial markets and institutions may develop to meet the needs of one set of industries, but then facilitate the growth of another younger group of industries. Alfred D. Chandler 1977 suggests this is, in fact, what happened in the United States. The nancial sector, especially investment banks and the corporate bond market, developed to meet the nancing needs of railroads in the mid-nineteenth century. The nancial infrastructure was, therefore, ready to meet the nancing needs of industrial rms as they started growing in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Similarly, Goldsmith 1985 , p2 based on a study of the balance-sheets of twenty countries writes The creation of a modern nancial superstructure, not in its details but in its essentials, was generally accomplished at a fairly early stage of a country's economic development".
Again, we can test this possibility more directly. W e estimate the e ect of nancial development only for industries that are small to start out with, and are unlikely to be responsible for the state of development of the nancial markets. So we estimate the basic regression for industries that in 1980 were less than the median size in their respective countries. The coe cient o f the interaction term is again unchanged see column four of Table 9 even for these industries, for whom the economy's nancial development is largely predetermined. We conclude that reverse causality is unlikely to explain our results.
D Other Explanations: Investment and Cost of Capital.
Investment opportunities in di erent industries may b e v ery di erent. For instance, the tobacco industry in the United States uses negative external nance see Table 1 partly because investment opportunities in the Tobacco industry are small relative to the cash ows the industry generates. It may be that our measure of dependence on external nance proxies primarily for the investment i n tensity of a particular industry. F urthermore, the development of the nancial sector may proxy for the overall cost of capital in that country rather than the cost of external funds. The interaction e ect then indicates that capital intensive rms grow faster in an environment with a lower cost of capital. Though this is a legitimate channel through which the nancial sector in uences growth, we are also interested in a di erent c hannel where the reduction in the incremental cost of external funds facilitates growth.
If investment i n tensity w ere all that mattered, and external nance and internal nance were equally costly, the cash internally generated by industries would be irrelevant in countries that are more nancially developed. All that mattered would be the size of the required investment and the cost of capital. By contrast, if there is a wedge between the cost of internal and external nance which narrows as the nancial sector develops, industries generating lots of internal cash should grow relatively faster in countries with a poorly developed nancial sector. As indicated in the rst column of Table 10 , they do. This is consistent with nancial development reducing the cost of external nance. Of course, as is to be expected with both the cost of capital" and cost of external capital" hypotheses, industries that invest a lot also grow faster in countries with more developed nancial markets second column. Unfortunately, when both interactions are introduced in the same regression, the coe cients are measured very imprecisely because of multi-collinearity cash ow i n tensity and investment i n tensity h a ve a correlation of 0.73. So neither is statistically di erent from zero. However, the coe cient on cash ows is still negative and sizeable accounting for a real growth rate di erential of about 0.4 percent per year.
Multicollinearity results from our aggregating cash ows and investments over a decade. 19 Therefore, we estimate the same regression using a measure of cash ow i n tensity and investment intensity measured for just one year rather than an entire decade. In the fourth column we report the estimates obtained by using the 1980 measures of cash ow and investment. Both the cash ow i n tensity and the investment i n tensity are statistically signi cant at the 5 percent level. We estimated but not report the same regression using a 1985 measure and a 1990 measure. In both cases the results are similar and both coe cients are statistically signi cant at the 5 percent level.
VI Conclusion
We develop a new methodology in this paper to investigate whether nancial sector development has an in uence on industrial growth. In doing so, we partially circumvent some of the problems with the existing cross-country methodology highlighted by Mankiw 1995. First, it is di cult to interpret observed correlations in cross-country regressions in a causal sense. Here, we push the causality debate one step further by nding evidence for a channel through which nance theoretically in uences growth. Also, since we h a ve m ultiple observations per country, w e can examine situations where the direction of causality is least likely to be reversed. A second problem with the traditional methodology is that explanatory variables are multi-collinear and are measured with error. The combination of these two problems may cause a variable to appear signi cant when it is merely a proxy for some other variable measured with error. As a result, observed correlations can be misleading. By looking at interaction e ects with country and industry indicators rather than direct e ects, we reduce the number of variables that we rely on, as well as the range of possible alternative explanations. Third, there is the problem of limited degrees of freedom there are fewer than two h undred countries on which the myriad theories have to be tested. Our approach partially alleviates this problem by exploiting withincountry variation in the data. Our methodology, m a y h a ve wider applications, such as testing the existence of channels through which h uman capital can a ect growth.
Apart from its methodological contribution, this paper's ndings may bear on three di erent areas of current research. First, they suggest that nancial development has a substantial supportive in uence on the rate of economic growth and this works, at least partly, b y reducing the cost of external nance to nancially dependent rms. We should add that there is no contradiction when the lack of persistence of economic growth Easterly, et al. 1993 is set against the persistence of nancial development. Other factors may cause potentially serially uncorrelated changes in a country's investment opportunity set. Finance may simply enable the pursuit of these opportunities, and thereby enhance long run growth. The paper does, however, suggest that nancial development m a y play a particularly bene cial role in the rise of new rms. If these rms are disproportionately the source of ideas, nancial development can enhance innovation, and thus enhance growth in indirect ways.
Second, in the context of the literature on nancial constraints, this paper provides fresh evidence that nancial market imperfections have an impact on investment and growth.
Finally, in the context of the trade literature, the ndings suggest a potential explanation for the pattern of industry specialization across countries. To the extent that nancial market development or the lack thereof is determined by historical accident o r g o vernment regulation, the existence of a well developed market in a certain country represents a source of comparative advantage for that country in industries that are more dependent on external nance. Similarly, the costs imposed by a lack of nancial development will favor incumbent rms over new entrants. Therefore, the level of nancial development can also be a factor in determining the size composition of an industry as well as its concentration. These issues are important areas for future research.
Notes 1
Apart from the papers discussed below, see Valerie R. Bencivenga and Bruce D. Smith 1991, John H. Boyd and Smith 1996 , King and Levine 1993 b, Giles Saint-Paul 1992 , and Maurice Obstfeld 1994 In Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990, there are no moral hazard or asymmetric information problems at the level of the entrepreneur. The intermediary simply provides information about economy wide trends that the entrepreneur cannot gure out for himself, enabling the entrepreneur to invest his own funds more productively. An equivalent formulation is to distinguish between savers and entrepreneurs. Absent nancial development, savers can invest directly only in safe, low return, government-sponsored projects, while nancial development can reduce adverse selection, enabling savers to invest in risky but often more productive entrepreneurs. See, for example, Robert J. Barro 1991 , Roger Kormendi and Philip Meguire 1985 , King and Levine 1993a , Levine and David Renelt 1992 , N. Grigori Mankiw, David Romer, and David Weil 1992 , and Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 1996 Colin Mayer 1990 does look at external nancing, but largely at the country level.
5
Even if capital markets are imperfect so that the supply is not perfectly elastic, this methodology provides a reasonable measure of the relative demand for funds provided the elasticity of the supply curve does not change substantially in the cross-section. By contrast, in a very imperfect capital market, the relative amount of funds raised may be a function not only of the demand for funds but also of factors that a ect supply, such as the availability of collateral.
6
This item is only de ned for cash ow statements with format codes 1, 2, or 3. For format code 7 we construct it as the sum of items 123, 125, 126, 106, 213, 217. 7 It could be argued that inter-rm trade credit should be viewed as a component of external nancing. It is unclear how m uch of trade credit is used to reduce transactions costs and how m uch is used for nancing. Much trade credit is granted routinely and repaid promptly and usually, net trade credit for a rm accounts receivable less payables is small see Mitchell A. Petersen and Rajan forthcoming. This may b e w h y trade credit is typically treated as part of operations in capital budgeting exercises. We adhere to this tradition. 8 We required that there be more than one observation in the industry for this variable to be computed. Even with this weak requirement w e do not have data for some industries. Most notably there are insu cient y oung rms in the Tobacco industry.
9
This amounts to saying that if the invention of personal computers increased the demand for external funds in the U.S. computer industry, i t i s l i k ely to increase the need for funds in the computer industry in other countries as well.
10
Not all the ISIC sectors for which the Yearbook of Industrial Statistics report data on value added are mutually exclusive. For example, drugs 3522 is a subsector of other chemicals 352. In these cases, the values of the broader sectors are net of the values of the subsectors that are separately reported. We follow this convention both for the data value added and for the nancial data from Compustat.
ows through the year. This may be a problem in high in ation countries. We therefore measure GDP as the GDP in constant prices multiplied by the producer price index where the base year for both series is ve y ears before the year of interest.
12
The regression estimates are not sensitive to dropping the few countries such as Denmark and Spain that changed accounting standards substantially.
13
The dependent v ariable is the average real growth rate over the period [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . For some countries, however, data availability limits the period. For no country do we h a ve data separated by less than 5 years. A potential concern is that we measure growth in value added rather than growth in output. Unfortunately, w e d o not have data for the latter. While we m a y not capture increases in productivity fully, w e see no obvious way i n which this should bias our results. 14 We reduce the impact of outliers by constraining growth between -1 and +1. Three observations are affected. The coe cient estimates for the interaction coe cient are higher and still signi cant when we do not do this, though the explanatory power of the regression is lower. We also re-estimate the same speci cation after winsorizing the 1 percent and 5 percent tails of the growth rate distribution obtaining virtually identical results except that the explanatory power of the regression is still higher.
15
When we instrument this measure see next paragraph, the coe cient estimate goes up by 50 percent suggesting the coe cient estimate is biased downwards by measurement error.
16
Of course, this raises the possibility of reverse causality which w e will address later.
17
An establishment is de ned as a unit which engages, under a single ownership or control, in one, or predominantly one, kind of activity at a single location." Industrial Statistics Yearbook p. 4. This de nition may not coincide with the legal boundaries of the rm, but is the only one available for such a large cross section of countries.
18
The disadvantage is that the industry classi cation used by the body compiling the number of rms may di er from the industry classi cation used by the body compiling value-added data, resulting in an increase in noise. Pattern of external nancing and investment across industries in the U.S. during the 1980s
The tablereports the median level of external nancing, equity nancing, and capital expenditure for ISIC industries during the 1980s. External dependence is the fraction of capital expenditures not nanced with cash ow from operations. Cash ow from operations is broadly de ned as the sum of Compustat funds from operations item 110, decreases in inventories, decreases in receivables, and increases in payables. Equity dependence is the ratio of the net amount of equity issues to capital expenditures. Capital expenditures are the ratio of capital expenditures to net property plan and equipment. Mature companies are rms that have been public for at least 10 years, correspondingly young companies are rms that went public less than 10 years ago. The year of going public is the rst year in which a company starts to be traded on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ. All companies is the union of mature and young rms plus rms for which the year of going public could not be determined rms already traded on NASDAQ in 1972. All the information is obtained from the ow of funds data in Compustat, except for the SIC code which is obtained from CRSP and then matched with the ISIC code. Financial development across countries.
Accounting standards is an index developed by the Center for International Financial Analysis & Research ranking the amount of disclosure in annual company reports in each country. T otal Capitalization to GDP is the ratio of the sum of equity market capitalization as reported by the IFC and domestic credit IFS line 32a-32f but not 32 e to GDP. Domestic credit to the private sector is IFS line 32d. Per capita income in 1980 is in dollars and is from the IFS.
Country
Accounting Summary Statistics.
Industry real growth is the annual compounded growth rate in real value added for the period 1980-1990 for each ISIC industry in each country. The growth in the number of rms is the di erence between the log of number of ending-period rms and the log of number of beginning-period rms. The average size of rms in the industry is obtained by dividing the value added in the industry by the number of rms, and the growth in average size is obtained again as a di erence in logs. The industry's share of total value added is computed dividing the 1980 value added of the industry by the total value added in manufacturing that year. External dependence is the median fraction of capital expenditures not nanced with cash ow from operations for each industry. Cash ow from operations is broadly de ned as the sum of Compustat funds from operations item 110, decreases in inventories, decreases in receivables, and increases in payables. External dependence has been constructed using Industry growth and various measures of development.
The dependent v ariable is the annual compounded growth rate in real value added for the period 1980-1990 for each ISIC industry in each country. External dependence is the fraction of capital expenditures not nanced with internal funds for U.S. rms in the same industry between 1980-90. The interaction variable is the product of external dependence and nancial development. Financial development is total capitalization in the rst column, domestic credit to the private sector over GDP in the second column, accounting standards in 1990 in the third column, accounting standards in 1983 in the fourth column. The sixth column is estimated with instrumental variables. Both the coe cient estimate for the interaction term and the standard error when accounting standards is the measure of development are multiplied by 100. The di erential in real growth rate measures in percentage terms how m uch faster an industry at the 75th percentile level of external dependence grows with respect to an industry and 25th percentile level when it is located in a country at the 75th percentile of nancial development rather than in one at the a 25th percentile. All regressions include both country and industry xed e ects coe cient estimates not reported. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are reported in brackets. Industry growth and various measures of development using external dependence measured for young rms.
The dependent v ariable is the annual compounded growth rate in real value added for the period 1980-1990 for each ISIC industry in each country. External dependence is the fraction of capital expenditures not nanced with internal funds between 1980-90 for U.S. rms who went public in the previous ten years belonging to the same industry. The interaction variable is the product of external dependence and nancial development. Financial development is total capitalization in the rst column, domestic credit to the private sector over GDP in the second column, accounting standards in 1990 in the third column, accounting standards in 1983 in the fourth column. The sixth column is estimated with instrumental variables. Both the coe cient estimate for the interaction term and the standard error when accounting standards is the measure of development are multiplied by 100. The di erential in real growth rate measures in percentage terms how m uch faster an industry at the 75th percentile level of external dependence grows with respect to an industry and 25th percentile level when it is located in a country at the 75th percentile of nancial development rather than in one at the a 25th percentile. All regressions include both country and industry xed e ects coe cient estimates not reported. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are reported in brackets. Industry growth and various measures of external dependence
The dependent v ariable is the annual compounded growth rate in real value added for the period 1980-1990 for each ISIC industry in each country. External dependence is the fraction of capital expenditures not nanced with internal funds by rms in the same industry during the 1980s. In the rst column this ratio is computed only for companies that have been public for at least 10 years, in the second column the ratio is computed for companies that have gone public in the last 9 years, in the second column it is computed for U.S. rms during the 1970s. In the third column it is computed for Canadian rms during the 1980s. Also in the third column, data on U.S. industries are included while data on Canadian industries are dropped. The di erential in real growth rate measures in percentage terms how m uch faster an industry at the 75th percentile level of external dependence grows with respect to an industry and 25th percentile level when it is located in a country at the 75th percentile of nancial development rather than in one at the a 25th percentile. All regressions are estimated using instrumental variables and include both country and industry xed e ects coe cient estimates not reported. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are reported in brackets. Di erential in real growth rate 0.9 0.9 0.8 Table 8 :
Growth in average size and number of establishments
The average size of establishments in the industry is obtained by dividing the value added in the industry by the number of establishments, and the growth in average size is obtained as a di erence in logs between average size in 1990 and average size in 1980. The growth in the number of establishments is the log of the number of establishments in 1990 less the log of the number of establishments in 1980. The di erential in real growth rate measures in percentage terms how m uch faster an industry at the 75th percentile level of external dependence grows with respect to an industry and 25th percentile level when it is located in a country at the 75th percentile of nancial development rather than in one at the a 25th percentile. All regressions are estimated using instrumental variables and include both country and industry xed e ects coe cient estimates not reported. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are reported in brackets. Robustness Checks
The dependent v ariable is the annual compounded growth rate in real value added for the period 1980-1990 for each ISIC industry in each country. The rst column adds to the basic speci cation the interaction between external dependence and a country's human capital. The second column adds to the basic speci cation the interaction between external dependence and a country's level of economic development log per capita income. The third column estimates the basic speci cation for industries that in 1980 were above the median industry in terms of the fraction they accounted for of value added in the manufacturing sector. The fourth column estimates the basic speci cation for industries that in 1980 were below the median industry in terms of the fraction they accounted for of value added in the manufacturing sector. The di erential in real growth rate measures in percentage terms how m uch faster an industry at the 75th percentile level of external dependence grows with respect to an industry and 25th percentile level when it is located in a country at the 75th percentile of nancial development rather than in one at the a 25th percentile. All regressions are estimated using instrumental variables and include both country and industry xed e ects coe cient estimates not reported. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are reported in brackets. Cash Flow and Investments
Human
The dependent v ariable is the annual compounded growth rate in real value added for the period 1980-1990 for each ISIC industry in each country. I n ternal cash ow is the ratio of cash ow from operations broadly de ned see text to net property plant and equipment for U.S. rms in the same industry. Investment i n tensity is the ratio of capital expenditures to property plant and equipment for U.S. rms in the same industry. The fourth column uses the cash ow i n tensity and the investment i n tensity measured for the year 1980. The di erential in real growth rate measures in percentage terms how m uch faster an industry at the 75th percentile level of external dependence grows with respect to an industry and 25th percentile level when it is located in a country at the 75th percentile of nancial development rather than in one at the a 25th percentile. All regressions are estimated using instrumental variables and include both country and industry xed e ects coe cient estimates not reported. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are reported in brackets. 
Equity Financing External Finance Investments
The graph plots the median level of external nancing, equity nancing, and investments in the U.S. across 3-digit SIC industries as a function of the numb e r o f y ears since the IPO. External nance is the amount o f i n vestments CAPEX not nanced with cash ow from operations, reduction in inventories, or decreases in trade credit. Equity nance is the net amount of funds raised through equity issues divided by the amount o f i n vestments. Investment is the ratio of CAPEX to net property, plant and equipment. The IPO year is de ned as the rst year in which a company starts to be traded on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ. All the information is obtained from the ow of funds data in Compustat, except for the SIC code which is from CRSP.
